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Abstract 
Using a sample of US bank mergers from 1995 to 2012, we observe that the pre-post 
merger changes in CEO bonus are significantly negatively related to the strength of 
corporate governance within the bidding bank. This suggests that bonus compensation 
is not consistent with the “optimal contracting hypothesis”. Salary changes, on the other 
hand, are not affected by corporate governance which is in line with “optimal 
contracting”. We also find that good governance is associated with more accretive deals 
for the bidder. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that, unlike salary and 
long-term compensation, bonus compensation is not aligned with value creation and is 
more vulnerable to CEO manipulation in banks with poor corporate governance. 
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1. Introduction 
The level of CEO compensation and its relationship with performance have been 
controversial topics following the recent financial crisis. Views diverge on the efficacy 
of compensation contracts in maximizing firm value and containing risk taking. 
Compensation in the financial industry, especially the large bonus packages paid to 
CEOs of underperforming banks, has attracted mounting criticism. As a result, from 
the beginning of 2014 the European Union has placed a cap on bankers’ bonuses.1 CEO 
compensation that engenders excessive risk taking and weak corporate governance 
more generally - has been cited as an important cause of the financial crisis by the 
OECD (Kirkpatric 2009). Against this backdrop it is surprising that little academic 
research has looked at the link between CEO compensation and corporate governance 
in the banking industry. In this paper, we provide evidence of the effects of corporate 
governance on CEO compensation in the context of bank mergers. Mergers provide a 
suitable laboratory to study CEO compensation as they are often accompanied by 
significant changes in firm valuation, performance and risk. The academic literature 
has found evidence of significantly higher levels of CEO compensation after M&A 
deals.2 In this study, we focus on the “optimal contracting hypothesis” in which CEO 
interests are assumed to be aligned with those of shareholders (see, for example, Core 
et al., 1999). Optimal contracting leads to CEO compensation that is positively and 
significantly related to firm value, and unrelated to the strength of corporate governance 
within the firm. This is because optimal contracting resolves the agency problem 
between CEO and shareholders and hence makes the heightened monitoring effected 
by good governance irrelevant. For our analysis, we use Thomson One Banker to source 
214 domestic bank mergers in the US announced between 1995 and 2012. We look at 
the US because it is one of the most active markets for corporate control. It has also 
been the epicentre of the Great Recession of 2007-2009 which has led to an 
international agreement on compensation guidelines, together with national legislation, 
to constrain short termism and risk taking in banks.3 
                                                 
1 The cap is 200% of salary. See Jill Treanor, European banks to get new guidelines on bonus cap and 
'allowances', 13 June 2014, The Guardian.  
2 See, for example, Bliss and Rosen (2001) and Anderson et al. (2004). 
3 In 2009, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) introduced principles of sound compensation practices 
that are “aligned with long-term value creation and prudent risk-taking”. The principles further state that 
“[f]or senior executives as well as other employees whose actions have a material impact on the risk 
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Our work contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, as far as we are 
aware, this is the first paper that examines how corporate governance affects CEO 
compensation around bank mergers. While previous studies have looked at industry 
diversified samples (e.g. Grinstein and Hribar, 2004 and Harford and Li, 2007), we 
concentrate on banks because of the distortions that compensation policies can produce 
on bank behaviour and the resulting impact on financial stability.4 Second, we show 
that the optimal contracting hypothesis can be accepted or rejected depending on the 
components of CEO compensation it is tested on, namely, salary, bonus or long term 
compensation. We find that while salary satisfies optimal contracting, the bonus 
component is significantly reduced by the strength of corporate governance which 
provides evidence against the null. This suggests that bonus compensation is not 
necessarily related to firm value creation. On the other hand, changes in long term 
compensation around mergers have a distinct behaviour that differs from that of salary 
and bonus. Indeed, long term rewards do not appear to be explained in any meaningful 
way by governance or performance variables. Third, we introduce a new index (CGI) 
to measure the strength of corporate governance. The index is purpose-built with hand 
collected data from company filings and considers 11 key drivers of good governance 
including board composition, CEO power, antitakeover measures, ownership 
concentration and legal environment. 5  Fourth, we provide evidence that the risk 
dimension is a crucial determinant of CEO compensation. Both changes in salary and 
                                                 
exposure of the firm: (1) a substantial proportion of compensation should be variable ... (2) a substantial 
portion of variable compensation, such as 40 to 60 percent, should be payable under deferral 
arrangements over a period of years; (3) these proportions should increase significantly along with the 
level of seniority and/or responsibility. Further, “Subdued or negative financial performance of the firm 
should generally lead to a considerable contraction of the firm’s total variable compensation, taking into 
account both current compensation and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including 
through malus or clawback arrangements.” The implementation of these principles has been undertaken 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (see BCBS (2010)), the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
Similar principles have been embedded in the Dodd-Frank Act that was signed into law in the United 
States in 2010.  
4 Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke stated that "Compensation practices at some banking 
organizations have led to misaligned incentives and excessive risk-taking, contributing to bank losses 
and financial instability". (press release October 22, 2009, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System) 
5 Our approach is consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who see 
corporate governance as a way to mitigate agency problems which arise from the separation of ownership 
and control. We are aware of an even broader perspective of corporate governance which involves a 
greater spectrum of stakeholders, such as depositors, employees, suppliers, society as a whole, etc. 
However, for the purpose of this study, we focus on corporate governance as a means to solve the agency 
problems between shareholders and managers. 
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bonus are negatively related to the risk taken by the bidding bank’s CEO, measured as 
the bidder’s stock price volatility around a merger. Moreover, when looking at banks 
that sought government support during the recent subprime crisis, we find that boards 
penalise higher risk taking by reducing CEO salary. However, though bonus changes 
were lower in banks that required government funding, the banks’ risk taking does not 
appear to have influenced bonus compensation.  
 
In line with previous literature (Masulis et al. 2007; Hagendorff et al. 2007, 2010), we 
also find that corporate governance is an important value driver for bidder abnormal 
returns, after controlling for other firm and deal related characteristics. For example, 
our governance index alone can explain up to 6.8% of the variations in bidders’ 
abnormal return around merger announcements. This suggests that good governance 
may lead to higher shareholder value.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review relevant literature. We describe 
our data and the composition of the corporate governance index in Sections 3 and 4. In 
Section 5 we describe our regression model. Sections 6 and 7 summarise our main 
findings and robustness tests. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review  
Our research is related to a strand of the literature that examines the effects of corporate 
governance on CEO compensation. Hallock (1997) find that interlocking directorships 
significantly increase CEO compensation. Borokhovich et al (1997) look at the effect 
of antitakeover charter amendments (ATAs) on the level of CEO compensation, and 
find that ATA adopting firms pay their CEOs significantly higher levels of 
compensation after controlling for other board and CEO characteristics and economic 
factors. Core et al. (1999) find that companies with weaker monitoring from the board 
of directors and a lack of shareholder control generally pay higher CEO compensation. 
Cyert et al (2002) also find that  internal governance mechanisms such as ownership by 
the board and the largest blockholder provide an effective control on CEO 
compensation, especially on equity-based compensation. Bebchuk and Fried (2005) 
measure CEO power within the firm and conclude that the more powerful the CEO, the 
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higher, and less sensitive to performance, the compensation level. Focusing on pay-
performance sensitivity, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) provide evidence 
supporting the “skimming model”, which contradicts the “optimal contracting 
hypothesis”. The authors find that CEOs are paid for luck, though this effect is reduced 
with strong corporate governance. Focusing on the banking industry, Sierra et al. (2006) 
observe that a strong board is associated with lower levels of compensation and slower 
increase in compensation. Also studying the banking industry but only focusing on 
privately held commercial banks, Cooper (2009) finds that board independence reduces 
both executive and director compensation. Moreover, directors receive higher pay in 
banks with better CAMELS (Capital, Asset, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and 
Sensitivity) ratings.   
 
Our study is also related to research studying CEO compensation and mergers. 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that the M&A related bonus paid to the CEO of the 
bidding firm is not affected by deal performance or bidding firm’s return on assets. 
However, measures of effort and CEO power are both significantly associated with a 
higher merger related bonus. Harford and Li (2007) find evidence that M&As insulate 
pay-performance sensitivity. While CEOs gain after value-increasing deals, they do not 
lose after value-destroying deals. However, pay-performance sensitivity when 
performance is poor is improved with strong governance. Yim (2013) finds significant 
increases in all major components of compensation following a merger. Also, while 
bonus increases subside 2 years after the acquisition, the increase in salary and equity 
based pay is more resilient. Therefore, the author predicts that younger CEOs are more 
likely to undertake acquisitions to reap long term compensation gains, and finds 
evidence that an increase in age of 20 years is associated with a 32% reduction in the 
probability that the CEO will undertake an acquisition. In the banking industry, Bliss 
and Rosen (2001) look at the largest bank holding companies in the US and find that 
CEO compensation increases significantly even for merger deals with negative stock 
price reactions. The authors conclude that the private benefit of increased compensation 
may motivate CEOs to engage in bank mergers. Anderson et al (2004) also find 
significant increases in cash and total compensation paid to acquiring firm CEOs. 
However, they ascribe the increase in compensation to combined value changes of the 
bidder and target banks. They argue that combined value changes of bidder and target 
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indicate expected synergies from the merger, which need managerial efforts to be 
realized. 
 
The third strand of relevant literature includes studies that link bank CEO compensation 
to risk taking. Chen et al. (2006) find that equity-based compensation has the effect of 
increasing bank risk. Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) focus on merging banks, and 
show that higher pay-risk sensitivity induces greater risk-taking incentives in bank 
M&A deals6. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is little evidence on whether 
CEOs are rewarded or punished for risk-increasing M&A deals.  
 
3. Data 
We obtain our initial sample of 478 domestic US bank mergers from the Thomson One 
Banker dataset, after imposing the following criteria: 
1. The deal is completed. 
2. The deal is announced between 1 Jan 1995 and 31 Dec 20127.  
3. There is a change in control. Following Faccio et al (2006) and Golubov et al  
(2012), we require that the bidder owns less than 10% of the shares of the target 
bank before the merger announcement, and raises its shareholding to above 50% 
after deal completion.  
4. We select deals in the banking industry, with both bidder and target banks 
classified as “Commercial banks, or Bank Holding Companies” in Thomson 
One Banker8.  
5. We choose only completed deals with acquirer market capitalization of at least 
$100 million, measured 4 weeks before merger announcement, and at least 10% 
                                                 
6 Datta et al. (2001) also find that high pay-performance sensitivity is associated with increased stock 
return volatility post-merger in general industries. 
7 The year of 1995 is selected as the beginning of the sample period because 1994 is the year from which 
Proxy Statements containing CEO compensation data and the corporate governance data are widely 
available on SEC Edgar website. 
8 This industry classification is based on the SIC code of the primary line of business, collected by 
Thomson One Banker. The SIC codes for the sample bidder and target banks fall into the following four 
categories: 6021 (National Commercial Banks), 6022 (State Commercial Banks), 6029 (Commercial 
Banks, Not Elsewhere Classified), and 6712 (Bank Holding Companies). 
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relative deal size, measured as the ratio between target’s and acquirer’s market 
capitalization9.  
6. The bidding bank is public while the target bank can be public or private. 
7. As in Alexandridis et al (2010), we exclude spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-
tenders, exchange offers, and repurchases. From the sample, we further exclude 
liquidations, leveraged buyouts, reverse takeovers, privatizations, bankruptcy 
acquisitions and going private deals, as in Golubov et al (2012). 
8. We include only non-overlapping deals. That is, we exclude cases where one 
acquirer makes multiple bids within two consecutive years. This is to avoid a 
compounding effect on CEO compensation (Harford and Li, 2007).  
9. We then require that the bidder’s financial statements, stock prices and SEC 
Edgar filings are available for the years around the merger.  
 
The above criteria reduce the sample size from 487 to 214. For the remaining 
transactions, we extract deal-related information from Thomson One Banker. We 
obtain financials from Datastream and stock data from CRSP. We have hand collected 
information on gender and education of the acquiring firm’s CEO from annual reports 
or if the data were not available there, from Bankscope. Summary statistics are reported 
in Table 1. We can see that the target is on average 30.7% the size of the bidder and is 
mostly a public company (69.6% of the cases). Only 22.7% of the deals are paid with 
cash. Almost half of bidders and targets are headquartered in the Mid-Atlantic (New 
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania) and South-Atlantic (Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington D.C., and West 
Virginia) regions. About two third of acquirers and targets are national commercial 
banks, as opposed to state banks or holding companies. 96.7% of the acquiring CEOs 
are male, while only a quarter holds an MBA. 
 
To examine the changes of CEO compensation around bank mergers we hand collect 
CEO salary, bonus, and long term compensation from Proxy Statements (DEF 14A file) 
which are available on the SEC Edgar website. The data prior to the merger are 
collected at the fiscal year-end before merger announcement, and the compensation 
                                                 
9 We focus on larger deals relative to the size of the acquirer as they are more likely to have an impact 
on the compensation of the acquiring CEO. 
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level after the merger is collected at the fiscal year-end of merger completion10. Long 
term compensation is the sum of the dollar value of restricted stock, stock option grants 
(valued as reported by the company in the Proxy Statement), long term incentive plans 
(LTIPs), and other long-term compensation. In Table 2 we look at CEO compensation 
data for the subsamples with continuing CEOs (Panel A), new internally promoted 
CEOs (Panel B), and new externally promoted CEOs (Panel C). It can be seen that 
compensation significantly increases post-merger only for the subsample with 
continuing CEOs. As shown in Panel A, the mean (median) increase in salary is 
$31,000 ($30,000), and both figures are statistically different from zero at the 1% 
significance level. The average bonus increase is positive though not significant, but 
the median bonus increase of $12,000 is positive and significant.11 The mean (median) 
increase in long-term compensation is $310,000 ($60,000), and both numbers are 
statistically significant. Although the average ratio of long-term compensation to 
annual cash compensation is 0.995 before merger, the proportional increase in long-
term compensation is significantly larger post-merger, resulting in an average pay mix 
of 1.216 post merger with an increase of 22%. This is consistent with Anderson et al. 
(2004) who find long term compensation increases at a faster pace than annual cash 
compensation. Contrary to the findings in Panel A, Panel B shows that new internally 
promoted CEOs receive significantly reduced levels of salary, while changes in bonus 
and long term compensation are not statistically significant. Panel C looks at 
compensation changes for new CEOs who are hired externally. Here the sample is too 
small (7 observations) to draw any firm conclusions. Following Harford and Li (2007), 
for the purpose of examining the effects of firm-, deal-, and corporate governance 
factors on CEO compensation changes around M&A deals, we focus on the subsample 
of continuing CEOs.  
 
                                                 
10 For example, if a bank merger is announced on 16 May 2005 and completed on 2 Feb 2006. Assuming 
the fiscal year end is 31 December (which is the case for the 99% of our sample banks), then the CEO 
compensation data is collected for the fiscal year of 2004 and fiscal year 2006.  
11 Here we should clarify that the positive and significant median in the Table has been computed on the 
cross-section of bonus changes, not simply as the difference between pre- and post-merger medians. The 
latter approach does not take into account the distribution of the changes and hence it would not be an 
appropriate measure. For the average, on the other hand, this calculation issue does not apply as the 
average of the changes is the same as the difference between pre and post-merger averages. 
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4. Corporate Governance Index 
Previous researchers have combined corporate governance characteristics into indices 
that were found to be strongly positively correlated with firm valuation and stock 
returns (Gompers et al. 2003; Bebchuk et al. 2009; Brown and Caylor 2006)12. In this 
study we follow a similar approach. We use a selection of governance indicators 
drawing from existing theory, empirical evidence and data availability for the firms in 
our sample. The indicators cover 6 areas of corporate governance namely anti-takeover 
provisions, the intensity of board monitoring, strength of monitoring by external 
shareholders, CEO power on the board, the extent to which CEO interest is aligned with 
shareholder interest, and the state of incorporation (i.e. whether the bidding bank is 
incorporated in the state of Delaware). We hand collect the corporate governance data 
from two major sources: SEC Edgar website (for proxy statements DEF-14A, 10-Q and 
10-K filings) and Thomson One Banker (for the Poison Pill data). Our index variables 
are 11 dummies that take the value 1 to indicate good corporate governance practice 
and 0 otherwise. Then, the values of all the dummies for each bidding bank are added 
up to form the bank’s Corporate Governance Index (CGI), which measures the overall 
strengths of corporate governance. We discuss the motivation behind each index 
component in detail below. 
 
Anti-takeover Provisions 
Firstly, we look at two types of anti-takeover measures, i.e. the presence of a “staggered 
board” and the inclusion of “poison pills” in the bank’s bylaws. Both variables appear 
in the 24-provision G-index of Gompers et al. (2003), the 6-provision E-index of 
Bebchuk et al. (2009), and the 3-provision external ATI-index of Cremers and Nair 
(2005). All these authors find that the two variables are associated with significantly 
lower firm value and stock returns. The “Staggered Board” and “Poison Pill” dummies 
are given a value of 1 if, before the merger announcement, the firm does not have a 
                                                 
12 Bebchuk et al. (2009) select 6 most important factors from the G-index of Gompers et al. (2003) and 
build an “Entrenchment Index”. The authors find that this parsimonious index has the same ability to 
explain the variations of firm value and abnormal returns as the G-Index. The other 18 factors are not 
important value or return drivers. Brown and Caylor (2006) utilize the ISS database with 51 factors 
covering a broad range of external and internal corporate governance characteristics, and find that better 
corporate governance, indicated by either the 51 full index (Gov-Score) or the parsimonious index (Gov-
7), is significantly positively associated with firm value. 
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staggered board and a poison pill respectively, and 0 otherwise. We then add these two 
dummies together to form a sub-index, “Sub_ATP”, to measure the ability of the bank 
to repel a takeover. A higher score indicates lower anti-takeover ability, i.e. better 
corporate governance indirectly obtained through the disciplining effect of potential 
takeovers.  
 
Board Monitoring 
Larger boards are less effective in communication, are more prone to free-riding 
problems, have less incentive to obtain information, and are more subject to CEO 
influence (Jensen 1993). Yermack (1996) finds that board size is significantly 
negatively related to firm valuation. On the other hand, the number of independent 
board members is found to have a positive impact on firm value, because outside 
directors have objectives that are better aligned with those of shareholders (Brickley 
and James 1987; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990). For the board size dummy, we give a 
score of 1 to a firm with board size smaller than our sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
For the board independence dummy, we assign a score of 1 to a firm with higher than 
median percentage of non-executive directors13. We then add the two variables together 
to obtain the “Sub_Board” sub-index that measures the strengths of board monitoring. 
 
Shareholder Monitoring 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) stress the importance of monitoring by large shareholders. 
There is also evidence that the existence of large external shareholders is associated 
with greater control of CEO compensation (Cyert et al. 2002; Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2003; Hartzell and Starks 2003). Here we focus on the monitoring effect 
of large outside blockholders, who are not employees of the bank and hold more than 
5% of common equity of the bidding bank (Core et al. 1999). We expect that the 
existence of a large external blockholder provides efficient monitoring and reduces 
CEO entrenchment14. We assign a score of 1 if the bidding bank has existing external 
blockholders, and 0 otherwise. This score is called “Sub_Blockholder”.  
                                                 
13 We do not have data on “independence” of directors, therefore we use the ratio of “non-executive 
director” to proxy for board independence. 
14 We do not consider the existence of internal blockholders who are employees of the bidding bank. 
The reason is that after examining our sample, the majority of internal blockholders are CEOs (there are 
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CEO Power 
To measure the extent to which the CEO can influence board decisions we look at CEO 
duality, that is whether the CEO is also the Chairman of the board, and if he or she sits 
on the nomination or compensation committees (Bebchuk et al. 2002; Bebchuk and 
Fried 2003; Grinstein and Hribar 2004). Having an independent compensation 
committee is among the measures recommended by the Dodd-Frank Act (Carpenter et 
al. 2010). Core et al. (1999) and Cyert et al. (2002) find that CEOs who are also board 
chairmen receive compensation 20% to 40% higher than others. A CEO sitting on the 
nomination committee or compensation committee signals the lack of independence of 
the committees and the significant power the CEO has on selecting board nominees15 
and their compensation levels. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that CEO duality and 
presence in the Nomination Committee lead to higher M&A related bonus for the CEO. 
We assign a score of 1 to the following three distinct CEO power dummies when the 
CEO is not the Chairman of the board, does not sit on the nomination committee, and 
does not sit on the compensation committee. If a CEO has too much power on a board, 
he is less likely to protect shareholder interest and more likely to extract a rent to his 
own benefit. We also combine these three indicators and add their scores to obtain a 
sub-index called “Sub_CEO _Power”.  
 
CEO-Shareholder Alignment 
The two variables used to indicate alignment of managerial and shareholder interests 
are CEO shareholding and CEO tenure. Managerial equity ownership is one of several 
important solutions to the agency problem resulting from the separation of ownership 
and control. Indeed, it is found to be positively related to firm performance and 
valuation (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Amihud et al. 1990). Consistent with the 
argument that CEO shareholding aligns CEO interest with shareholder interests, Core 
et al (1999) and Cyert et al. (2002) find that the level of CEO compensation is 
significantly negatively related to the percentage of CEO shareholding. On the other 
                                                 
only 2 cases where the internal blockholder is not the CEO). Thus, we exclude internal blockholders to 
avoid double-counting the effect of CEO ownership. 
15 Sometimes, the bidding bank does not have an existing nomination committee, and the nomination 
and selection of board members are performed by the board of directors as a whole. In this cases, we 
treat them as if CEO sits on the committee because effectively the CEO will have greater power on board 
member selection. 
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hand, there are different interpretations of the relationship between CEO tenure and the 
strength of corporate governance. High CEO tenure can indicate high CEO power and 
entrenchment16. In contrast, CEO tenure can also be an indicator of the quality of CEO, 
insofar as CEOs who have done a good job at protecting shareholder value are more 
likely to remain in office longer. Also long standing CEOs are more likely to have 
accumulated the firm specific skills and knowledge that enable them to perform better 
on the job. We support this latter interpretation and consider tenure as a positive 
indicator of CEO-shareholder alignment. We measure CEO tenure as the number of 
years the CEO has been serving on the board of directors17. The two dummies that 
capture CEO shareholding and tenure are given a value of 1 to indicate high level of 
alignment with shareholder interest, i.e. when the CEO has above median percentage 
of share ownership and above median tenure relative to other CEOs in the sample. The 
sum of these two variables, “Sub_CEO_Shareholder”, indicates the extent to which 
the CEO attends to shareholder interest. 
 
Delaware 
The last aspect of corporate governance we include in our corporate governance index 
relates to the State of incorporation. We look at whether the bidding bank is 
incorporated in Delaware whose corporate legislation is more “pro management” than 
other states (Cary 1974). Danielson and Karpoff (1998) find that Delaware firms have 
more anti-takeover provisions compared to non-Delaware firms, and the difference is 
statistically significant. We assign a score of 1 to bidding banks which are not 
incorporated in Delaware, to indicate stronger corporate governance, and 0 otherwise. 
This variable is named “Sub_Delaware”. 
 
In Table 3 we present summary statistics for our governance indicators (Panel A) and 
the distribution of the Corporate Governance Index (Panel B and Figure 1). 
Interestingly, Figure 1 shows that the CGI gradually increases during the 18 years of 
                                                 
16 With longer board tenure, the CEO may have more influence over the board members who are selected 
by the CEO (Baker and Gompers 2003) and there is also evidence that longer CEO tenure is associated 
with less equity-based pay and higher levels of annual cash compensation (Fahlenbrach 2009).  
17
 We couldn’t obtain data on the years the CEO has held the title of CEO as not all firms report this data 
in the proxy statement. Our measurement of CEO tenure using the years of the CEO being on the board 
of directors is consistent with Fahlenbrach (2009). 
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our sample. If we compare the CGI of the second half of the sample period (2004 to 
2012) to the first half (1995 to 2003), we see a statistically significant difference 
between the means (5.91 to 7.02) and medians (6 increases to 7). The break point of 
our two sample periods (year-end 2003) coincides with the time surrounding the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and the changes in subsequent listing 
requirements on the major US exchanges. Our findings suggest that such measures may 
have been effective in increasing the strength of corporate governance, at least in the 
banking industry. 
 
5. Model 
In our study we test the “optimal contracting hypothesis” by employing CEO 
compensation changes around bank mergers. CEO compensation satisfies optimal 
contracting when it is designed to maximize firm value. The level of compensation is 
the result of supply and demand in the executive recruitment market, and the effort level 
that the CEO exerts in managing the firm. In the “hidden action” model by Holmstrom 
(1979), performance measures (such as accounting profitability or stock returns) and 
firm value measures (such as M/B ratio) are used to proxy for the effort exerted by the 
CEO. If the CEO compensation is optimal, then there is no role for corporate 
governance as the CEO will not have the remuneration incentives to extract rent even 
when corporate governance is poor. Moreover, bank CEO compensation should not 
encourage excessive risk taking which, as the subprime crisis has amply demonstrated, 
could have a detrimental impact on the survival of the bank and the stability of the 
financial system.  
 
The model we use to test the above is: 
 
∆Compensationi=αi+β1FIRM+β2DEAL+β3CG+β4[YEAR DUMMIES]+εi   (1) 
 
where the dependent variable ΔCompensationi is the changes in natural log of different 
forms of CEO compensation from the fiscal year before the merger announcement to 
the fiscal year of the deal completion, similar to Anderson et al. (2004) and Avery et al. 
(1998). The individual dependent variables are calculated using the following formulas: 
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∆Salaryi = LN(Post-merger salary) – LN(Pre-merger salary) 
∆Bonusi = LN(Post-merger bonus + Pre-merger salary) – LN(Pre-merger bonus + Pre-
merger salary) 
∆Long Term Compensationi = LN(Post-merger long term compensation + Pre-merger 
salary) – LN(Pre-merger long term compensation + Pre-merger salary) 
 
FIRM is a vector of firm-specific financial characteristics which are related to 
compensation, DEAL is a vector of deal-related factors, and CG represents our 
corporate governance measures.  
 
6. Results 
We start our analysis of CEO compensation by looking at its salary component. As we 
can see from Table 4 Panel A, variations in CEO salary and changes in the M/B ratio 
are positively and statistically significantly related. This suggests that the post-merger 
salary of the bidding bank’s CEO may factor in his effort to increase growth opportunity 
through the merger. The finding is in line with the optimal contracting hypothesis and 
with previous literature where firm growth potential is proxied by the M/B ratio (Core 
et al. 1999; Harford and Li 2007) or Tobin’s Q (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Ozkan 2012). 
Further, changes in firm risk, measured as the bidder’s daily stock return volatility over 
the fiscal years around the merger, significantly reduce CEO salary post-merger. 
Interestingly, deal-related characteristics are not found to affect salary changes. 
Specifically, a popular measure of deal quality, the cumulative adjusted return (CAR3), 
does not have a statistically significant coefficient. This suggests that CEOs are not 
penalised when they complete bad deals. The result contrasts with Anderson et al 
(2004) who find that changes in compensation are positively associated with bidder’s 
stock return around a merger. Turning to the focus of this study, our corporate 
governance index (CGI) is negatively related to salary changes, but its coefficient is not 
statistically significant. When we replace our CGI index with its constituent sub-indices 
in Panel B, we obtain qualitatively similar results. Again, this is confirmation of optimal 
contracting as far as CEO salary is concerned. Lastly, we find that the bidder size before 
the merger is strongly negatively related to CEO salary changes. Although CEO 
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compensation is commonly found to increase with firm size, this finding is not 
surprising as we look at compensation changes instead of levels. Since CEOs of larger 
banks will normally have larger pre-merger salaries than smaller banks, their increase 
following a merger may be relatively lower than for smaller banks.  
 
With respect to bunus compensation, we find that the changes in M/B ratio are 
negatively and significantly related to changes in CEO cash bonus. This suggests that 
companies experiencing higher growth through M&As tend to have relatively lower 
cash bonus increases. A plausible explanation is that high growth bidders and their 
CEOs prefer the variable components of compensation to be based more on stock 
options rather than cash. This is because stock options are better able to capture the 
upside potential of a fast growing business while at the same time bringing into line 
CEO’s and shareholders’ interests. Stock options are typically included in the long term 
component of the CEO compensation package. Indeed, the M/B ratio is positively 
related to long term compensation, though not statistically significant. Consistent with 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004), we find that bidder announcement returns do not 
significantly improve bonus-related payments post-merger. Contrary to Grinstein and 
Hribar (2004), however, measures of effort such as deal relative size, geographical 
diversification, and time to complete the deal do not significantly affect the changes in 
bonus payment.  
 
The negative and significant coefficient of CGI for bonus compensation suggests that 
as the strength of corporate governance increases, changes in bonus around bank 
mergers decline. The implication is that bonus does not satisfy the optimal contracting 
hypothesis as the terms of the contract are not solely driven by CEO performance. The 
size of the CGI coefficient indicates that, following an increase of 1 point in the CGI 
(i.e. by changing 1 of the 11 corporate governance measures from “bad” to “good”), 
CEO bonus declines by 5.4% relative to the pre-merger salary level. Panel B of Table 
4 shows that the significance of the CGI coefficient is mainly due to the CEO power 
sub-index. This result is consistent with Grinstein and Hribar (2004) who also focus on 
the power of the CEO in increasing merger-related bonus payment. Finally, we find 
evidence that CEOs receive lower bonus post-merger if bank risk is increased due to 
the merger. This result is in line with our findings for salary. 
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Turning to long-term compensation, the main finding is that it is not explained by the 
common factors that influence salary and bonus. None of the explanatory variables is 
significant with the exception of RELATIVESIZE. As the size of the target relative to 
the bidder increases so does the downside potential of the transaction. So increasing 
long term compensation with the relative size of the target may act as a form of 
insurance to help secure a longer term commitment on the part of the CEO to make the 
merger work. CGI (Panel A) and its sub-indices (Panel B) in general do not appear to 
affect long term compensation changes. R-squared across specifications is very low. 
Such results provide limited evidence of “optimal contracting”.  
One may wonder if the stronger alignment between shareholders’ and CEO’s interests 
brought about by stronger corporate governance actually translates into higher 
shareholder returns around mergers. We examine the relationship between CGI and 
bidder announcement return measured over several event windows. We firstly run the 
regression with CGI (and a constant term) only. Results are shown in Panel A in Table 
5. Across event windows between 1 to 21 days, CGI has consistently positive and 
statistically significant coefficients. We then include control variables (Panel B). 
Following Masulis et al. (2007), we add bidder size, leverage, M/B ratio of assets, pre-
merger stock return as firm financial characteristics, and relative deal size, public target 
dummy variable, method of payment, and geographic diversification as deal-related 
characteristics plus the usual controls. The positive coefficient of CGI on bidder 
abnormal return persists across specifications. It is also significant for most CARs. 
Other control variables are not statistically significant.  
 
7. Robustness  
We undertake a number of robustness tests. Firstly, we consider whether executive 
compensation restrictions imposed on banks that requested government support during 
the recent subprime crisis would affect the influence of the corporate governance index 
on CEO compensation. TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) is a program whose 
aim was to assist troubled institutions during the financial crisis from 2008 onwards. 
All recipients of TARP are subject to executive compensation restrictions for as long 
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as they have not repaid the funding received from the Treasury18.  We obtain the status 
of bidding bank as a TARP recipient from Propublica19, which provides information on 
the dates and value of the initiation of the relief program and the following repayments 
made by the recipient. If the bidding bank receives TARP assistance and undertakes a 
merger during the assistance period, we assign a TARP RECIPIENT dummy a value 
of 1, and 0 otherwise. In addition, we interact the ΔRISK variable with TARP 
RECIPIENT to examine whether being a TARP recipient and making a merger deal 
during the time of TARP assistance would lead the bidding bank to have a different 
attitude towards merger-related risk. TARP was intended to stabilize the financial 
sector through capital injections and asset purchases but at the same time encouraged 
additional loans which might increase risk taking. As found by Black and Hazelwood 
(2013), loan origination risk increased in large TARP banks but fell in small TARP 
banks. Results in Table 6 show that our main findings do not change. Interestingly, 
while TARP banks generally pay lower salaries and bonuses post-merger compared to 
non-TARP banks, TARP banks punish risk-increasing CEOs by reducing salary rather 
than bonus. In terms of using lowering compensation to control additional risk-taking 
through bank mergers, TARP has a better control of salary payment compared to bonus. 
 
In unreported results, we also changed the form of dependent variable to the dollar 
value of compensation changes (instead of using the changes in natural log of 
compensation levels) and obtain qualitatively the same coefficients for CGI. 
Furthermore, we control for CEO’s age in the regressions to account for the possibility 
that younger CEOs are more likely to undertake acquisitions in order to benefit from 
the increased compensation after acquisitions (Yim 2013). The inclusion of CEO age 
does not qualitatively change our results for CGI.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Using a sample of US bank mergers from 1995 to 2012, we find that CEO salary 
changes around bank mergers are not influenced by the strength of its corporate 
                                                 
18
For details of TARP on compensation, please refer to http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/TARP-Programs/executive-comp /Pages/overview.aspx 
19 http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list 
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governance. This suggests that CEO salary is typically set to align CEO’s interests with 
those of shareholders, a condition that satisfies the “optimal contracting hypothesis”. 
However, cash bonus changes are negatively related to firm performance and are 
clearly influenced by the quality of corporate governance. The implication is that the 
cash bonus is not set to maximise shareholder value. We also find that the strength of 
corporate governance is significantly positively associated with bidder announcement 
returns. So, poorly governed banks appear to undertake acquisitions that are detrimental 
to shareholders, but reward their CEOs with higher post-merger bonuses. Our results 
support the recent move by bank regulators to favour compensation packages for senior 
executives that are mostly variable and deferred over a number of years. Unlike cash 
bonuses, such deferral arrangements allow for reductions in payouts of amounts 
previously earned through clawbacks and malus, which are designed to bring into line 
CEO objectives with those of the firm (FSB 2009).  
 
The fact that regulators are becoming so much more involved in compensation 
arrangements suggests that internal mechanisms need improvement. The growing 
literature on the work of compensation consultants and their relationships with directors 
is interesting and valuable in this respect, but tends to focus on total remuneration 
(Rennebooog and Zhao, 2011). Our results show that different forces are at work in the 
setting of salaries, bonuses and long-term incentives. Future research should consider 
the individual components of compensation with the objective of ensuring that there 
are no perverse incentives within the package. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of M&A deals and bidding banks 
 
The sample includes 214 M&A deals in the US banking industry from 1995 to 2012. Panel A shows deal 
related characteristics: AMV is the acquirer’s market capitalization 4 weeks before announcement, 
VALUE is the deal value as reported by Thomson One Banker, RELATIVESIZE is the ratio between 
VALUE and AMV. PAY_CASH is the proportion of the acquisition payment made in cash. TIME equals 
to the number of days between the announcement date and the completion date divided by 365. CAR3 
is the 3-day bidder announcement return over the (-1, +1) event window, measured using the market 
model with parameters estimated from 200 days to 29 days before the merger announcement. CRSP 
value-weighted index is used as the market benchmark. GDIV is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
bidder and target have headquarters in different states. PUBLICTARGET is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the target is publically traded, and 0 otherwise. SAMECEO is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the CEO remains until the end of the completion year. INTERNAL (EXTERNAL) is a dummy 
variable that indicates whether the pre-merger CEO is replaced by an internally (externally) hired CEO 
after the merger. Panel B shows fixed effect variables. “Region” includes the nine US Census-Bureau 
designated regions. Under Industrial Classification, we classify banks according to their SIC codes. 
Acquiring CEO gender and education are dummy variables that equal 1 if bidding bank CEO is MALE 
and holds an MBA, respectively. In Panel C, we compare the financial characteristics of bidding banks 
before and after the acquisition. The data are obtained for the fiscal year before merger announcement 
and the fiscal year of merger completion.  EQUITY is the book value of common equity, ASSET is the 
book value of total assets, M/B is calculated as the market value of total assets, ROA is calculated using 
net income divided by book value of total assets, RETURN is the annual stock return for the whole fiscal 
year. LEVERAGE is defined as the book value of total assets divided by book value of equity. RISK is 
the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the whole fiscal year. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Deal Characteristics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 5% Median 95% 
AMV ($m) 3,453 12,651 115  397 17,186  
VALUE ($m) 1,096 4,648  24  97 5,866  
RELATIVESIZE 0.307 0.235 0.109 0.223 0.796 
PAY_CASH  0.227 0.363 0 0 1 
TIME 0.449 0.153 0.253 0.433 0.689 
CAR3 -1.65% 6.12% -9.74% -1.03% 4.97% 
GDIV 0.341     
PUBLICTARGET 0.696     
SAMECEO 0.846     
INTERNAL 0.121     
EXTERNAL 0.033     
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Table 1 – Continued 
 
 
Panel B. Fixed Effects Variables and CEO Status   
Region Acquirer % Target % 
Northeast: New England 8.9 7.0 
Northeast: Mid-Atlantic 22.9 21.5 
Midwest: East North Central 16.4 15.9 
Midwest: West North Central 2.8 1.9 
South: South Atlantic 22.4 24.3 
South: East South Central 7.0 7.0 
South: West South Central 9.3 10.7 
West: Mountain 0.5 1.4 
West: Pacific 9.8 10.3 
   
Industrial Classification (SIC Codes) Acquirer % Target % 
National Commercial Banks (SIC 6021) 63.1 61.2 
State Commercial Banks (SIC  6022) 27.6 32.2 
Bank Holding Companies (SIC 6712 and 6029) 9.3 6.5 
   
Acquiring CEO Gender and Education %  
Male 96.7  
MBA 26.8  
 
 
 
Panel C. Bidding Bank Financial Characteristics 
C.1 Fiscal Year Prior to Merger Announcement 
  Mean Std. Dev. 5% Median 95% 
EQUITY ($m) 1,652 5,721 57  230 8,908  
ASSET ($m) 20,804 77,959 593  2,433 91,644  
M/B 1.087 0.061 1.004 1.091 1.177 
ROA 0.011 0.004 0.006 0.011 0.016 
RETURN 0.112 0.242 -0.262 0.119 0.506 
LEVERAGE 11.414 2.448 7.595 11.273 15.554 
RISK 0.02 0.008 0.010 0.018 0.034 
 
C.2 Fiscal Year of Merger Completion 
 Mean Std. Dev. 5% Median 95% 
EQUITY ($m) 2,592 9,934 78  333 13,529  
ASSET ($m) 31,570 131,000 855  3,386 140,916  
MB 1.075 0.065 0.984 1.068 1.184 
ROA 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.01 0.015 
RETURN 0.036 0.295 -0.538 0.043 0.483 
LEVERAGE 11.105 2.31 7.753 10.821 15.047 
RISK 0.022 0.02 0.010 0.018 0.043 
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Table 1 – Continued 
 
 
 
C.3 Change around M&A Deals 
 Mean t-stat Median Wilxon Stat  
 
EQUITY ($m) 940*** 2.95 84*** 12.50  
ASSET ($m) 10,768*** 2.70 863*** 12.50  
MB -0.012*** -2.69 -0.012*** 3.00  
ROA -0.002*** -7.53 -0.001*** 7.35  
RETURN -0.076*** -2.99 -0.061*** 2.70  
LEVERAGE -0.309** -2.38 -0.129** 2.20  
RISK 0.002 1.48 0.001 1.03  
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Table 2   
CEO Compensation around Bank M&As 
 
This table shows the levels and changes of CEO compensation of bidding banks in our M&A sample. 
Sample period is 1995-2012. The “Pre-merger” data is collected for the fiscal year before merger 
announcement; and the “Post-merger” data is collected for the fiscal year after merger completion. Bonus 
is the cash component of the bonus payment, and long-term compensation includes the value of restricted 
stock, stock options, long term incentive plan, and other long-term elements. “Pay Mix” is calculated as 
the ratio of “long term” compensation over the sum of salary and bonus. Panels A, B, and C show CEO 
compensation data for the subsamples with continuing CEOs, internally promoted CEOs, and externally 
hired CEOs, respectively. All dollar values are measured in thousands. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Pre-merger Post-merger Change (Dollar Value) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-stat. Median Wilxon 
 
Panel A. Continuing CEOs ($ thousands) – N=181 
Salary 439 364 470 400 31*** 2.96 30*** 9.80 
Bonus 325 136 370 117 45 1.41 12** 2.20 
Long Term 1,006 246 1,316 338 310** 2.10 60*** 4.85 
Pay Mix 0.995 0.490 1.216 0.623 0.221* 1.86 0.027*** 2.94 
         
Panel B. New CEO – Internally promoted ($ thousands) – N=26 
Salary 462 368 403 364 -59*** -2.89 -45** 2.53 
Bonus 375 77 302 75 -73 -1.08 -10 1.52 
Long Term 1,162 226 845 421 -317 -0.74 1 0.41 
Pay Mix 0.741 0.458 0.966 0.681 0.225 1.04 0.08 1.24 
         
Panel C. New CEO – Externally hired ($ thousands) – N=7 
Salary 364 226 403 255 39 0.71 41 1.10 
Bonus 350 110 149 59 -201 -0.99 18 0 
Long Term 875 98 3,345 439 2,471 1.49 160* 1.77 
Pay Mix 0.658 0.395 3.716 1.723 3.059 1.51 0.996* 1.77 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
Table 3  
Corporate Governance Data 
 
This table shows descriptive statistics for corporate governance indicators (Panel A) and the distribution 
of our Corporate Governance Index (Panel B). STAG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a 
staggered board. PP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a poison pill in its bylaws in the 
year before merger announcement. BSIZE is the number of directors on the board. BINDEP is the 
percentage of directors who are not employees of the firm. DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board. NOMIN (COMPEN) is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the CEO also sits on the nomination (compensation) committee or there is no separate nomination 
(compensation) committee. TENURE is the number of years the CEO has been serving on the board as 
a director. HOLDING is the percentage of common shares held by the CEO. BLOCK is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the bidding bank has a large external blockholder who holds at least 5% of the 
common shares outstanding. DELA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bidding bank is incorporated 
in the state of Delaware. The Corporate Governance Index (CGI) combines all the above measures.  
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for corporate governance variables 
 STAG PP BSIZE BINDEP DUALITY NOMIN 
Mean 0.724 0.206 13 0.878 0.533 0.402 
Median 1 0 12 0.900 1 0 
 
 COMPEN TENURE HOLDING BLOCK DELA  
Mean 0.098 12 2.081 0.523 0.150  
Median 0 12 0.425 1 0  
 
Panel B. Distribution of CGI 
Value Count Percent Cum.Count Cum.Percent   
2 1 0.5 1 0.5   
3 5 2.3 6 2.8   
4 26 12.2 32 15.0   
5 28 13.1 60 28.0   
6 57 26.6 117 54.7   
7 36 16.8 153 71.5   
8 35 16.4 188 87.9   
9 20 9.4 208 97.2   
10 6 2.8 214 100.0   
Total 214 100.0 214 100.0   
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Table 4  
Determinants of CEO compensation changes 
 
This table shows the determinants of changes in CEO salary, bonus and long term compensation for our 
1995-2012 sample of bank mergers. Continuing CEOs only are considered. The dependent variables are 
the log changes in CEO salary (ΔLNSALARY), bonus (ΔLNBONUS) and long term compensation 
(ΔLNLT) between the fiscal year of merger completion and the fiscal year before merger announcement. 
LNAMV is the natural log of bidder market capitalization 4 weeks before merger announcement. Relative 
Size is the ratio of deal value as reported by Thomson One Banker divided by the acquirer market value. 
M/B is the market value of assets. ROA is the return on assets, calculated as net income divided by book 
value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. RETURN is the annual stock return for the fiscal year. 
LEVERAGE measures financial leverage, calculated as book value of total assets divided by book value 
of equity. RISK is the daily stock return volatility over one fiscal year. All these financial variables are 
measured for the fiscal year before merger announcement and for the fiscal year of merger completion. 
CAR3 is the bidder’s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) measured over the 3-day announcement 
window (-1, +1), with parameters estimated over (-229, -29) days relative to merger announcement, using 
the market model and the value-weighted CRSP index as the benchmark. PAY_CASH is the ratio of 
payment made in cash. TIME measures the number of days between announcement date and completion 
date divided by 365. PUBLICTARGET is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target bank is publicly 
traded. GDIV is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the headquarters of the bidder and target are not in the 
same State. SUB_ATP, SUB_BOARD, SUB_BLOCKHOLDER, SUB_CEO_POWER, 
SUB_CEO_SHAREHOLDER, and SUB_DELAWARE are corporate governance sub-indices as 
defined in the paper. CGI is the overall corporate governance index, which is the sum of the sub-indices 
added together. We control for industry fixed effect, regional fixed effect, CEO fixed effect, financial 
crisis fixed effect and year fixed effect. We use White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariances. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Changes in Compensation – CGI 
 
 ΔLNSALARY ΔLNBONUS ΔLNLT 
C 0.508  0.757  -1.165  
LNAMV -0.027** 0.010  0.053  
RELATIVESIZE 0.067  -0.145  0.486* 
M/B-1 -0.427  -0.345  0.327  
ΔM/B 0.989* -1.547* 1.567  
ROA-1 7.020  -13.940  34.354  
ΔROA 0.394  18.402  24.021  
RETURN-1 0.014  0.140  0.438  
ΔRETURN -0.061  0.196  0.131  
LEVERAGE-1 0.002  0.000  0.038  
ΔLEVERAGE -0.016  0.020  0.002  
RISK-1 0.699  3.599  11.189  
ΔRISK -3.741*** -1.216* -0.182  
CAR3 0.199  -0.049  -0.598  
PAY_CASH -0.023  -0.062  -0.099  
TIME -0.044  -0.178  0.109  
PUBLICTARGET 0.017  0.028  -0.111  
GDIV 0.047  -0.067  -0.029  
CGI -0.008  -0.054** 0.016  
    
Adj. R-squared 0.211 0.065 0.006 
No. of obs. 162 162 162 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes 
CEO FE Yes Yes Yes 
Financial Crisis FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4 – Continued 
 
Panel B. Changes in Compensation – Sub-indices 
 
 ΔLNSALARY ΔLNBONUS ΔLNLT 
C 0.406  1.255  -1.864  
LNAMV -0.027** 0.015  0.039  
RELATIVESIZE 0.074  -0.137  0.442  
M/B-1 -0.422  -0.697  1.056  
ΔM/B 0.993* -1.729** 2.067  
ROA-1 8.641  -16.145  34.940  
ΔROA 0.624  17.285  26.264  
RETURN-1 -0.028  0.279  0.345  
ΔRETURN -0.101  0.270* 0.045  
LEVERAGE-1 0.006  -0.002  0.033  
ΔLEVERAGE -0.016  0.019  0.001  
RISK-1 0.826  4.881  9.081  
ΔRISK -3.569*** -1.054  -0.390  
CAR3 0.236  -0.211  -0.255  
PAY_CASH -0.001  -0.079  -0.090  
TIME -0.084  -0.267  0.292  
PUBLICTARGET 0.012  0.019  -0.087  
GDIV 0.054  -0.064  -0.047  
SUB_ATP 0.004  -0.002  -0.097  
SUB_BOARD -0.038  -0.060  -0.022  
SUB_BLOCK -0.025  -0.086  0.167  
SUB_CEO_POWER 0.027  -0.114** 0.096  
SUB_CEO_SHAREHOLDER -0.026  -0.051  0.050  
SUB_DELAWARE 0.064  -0.016  -0.109  
 
Adj. R-squared 
No. of obs. 
Industry FE 
Regional FE 
CEO FE 
Financial Crisis FE 
Year FE 
 
0.218 
162 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
0.057 
162 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
0.001 
162 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
Table 5 
CGI and Bidder Returns 
 
This table shows the OLS regression results with bidder announcement returns over different event 
windows as dependent variable, and CGI as a key independent variable. We control for bidding bank 
characteristics and deal characteristics. Our sample includes 214 bank mergers (including deals with 
continuing CEOs and different CEOs). CAR1, CAR3, CAR5, CAR7, CAR11, CAR21 indicates bidder 
cumulative abnormal return over 1-day (day 0), 3-day (-1, +1), 5-day (-2, +2), 7-day (-3, +3), 11-day 
(-5, +5), 21-day (-10, +10) event windows. We scale up the dependent variable by 100. CGI is our 
corporate governance index. LNAMV is the natural log of bidder market value 4 weeks before merger 
announcement, as reported by Thomson One Banker. LEVERAGE-1 is the financial leverage at the end 
of the fiscal year before merger announcement, calculated as book value of total asset divided by book 
value of total equity. M/B-1 is the market-to-book ratio of assets at the end of the fiscal year before merger 
announcement. RETURN-1 is the stock return for the bidding banks over the whole fiscal year before 
merger announcement. RELATIVESIZE is the relative size of the deal, calculated as deal value, as 
reported by Thomson One Banker, divided by bidder market value. GDIV is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the bidder and target have headquarters in different States. PUBLICTARGET is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the target bank is publicly listed. CASH is the ratio of payment made in cash. In 
Panel B we control for industry fixed effects, regional fixed effects, CEO fixed effects, financial crisis 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. We use White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & 
covariances. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
Panel A       
 (i) 
CAR1 
(ii) 
CAR3 
(iii) 
CAR5 
(iv) 
CAR7 
(v) 
CAR11 
(vi) 
CAR21 
C -5.020*** -7.227*** -7.224*** -8.814*** -8.942*** -9.554*** 
CGI 0.555*** 0.866*** 0.846*** 1.086*** 1.077*** 1.070*** 
       
Adj. R-squared 0.057 0.053 0.048 0.068 0.052 0.033 
No. of obs. 207 207 207 207 207 207 
       
       
Panel B       
 (i) 
CAR1 
(ii) 
CAR3 
(iii) 
CAR5 
(iv) 
CAR7 
(v) 
CAR11 
(vi) 
CAR21 
C 6.761  4.275  -0.685  -14.923  -28.166  -25.903  
CGI 0.253  0.621** 0.582** 0.745** 0.873** 0.813  
LNAMV -0.259  0.079  -0.128  0.027  0.160  0.020  
LEVERAGE-1 -0.125  -0.198  -0.145  0.099  0.037  0.188  
M/B-1 -2.949  -5.750  -3.950  6.032  12.167  8.870  
RETURN-1 -1.004  -3.897  -3.823  -1.095  0.800  -0.930  
RELATIVESIZE -2.162  -1.194  -1.890  -0.938  -0.779  1.469  
GDIV -0.952  -1.407  -1.721  -0.962  -0.924  1.663  
PUBLICTARGET -1.168  -0.293  0.091  -1.522  -1.043  -2.285  
PAY_CASH 0.002  0.023  0.016  0.009  0.005  0.000  
       
Adj. R-squared 0.240 0.136 0.088 0.118 0.100 0.043 
No. of obs. 195 195 195 195 195  195 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial Crisis FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6 
Robustness Tests 
 
This table shows the determinants of CEO compensation when considering the effect of government 
support during the subprime crisis. TARP RECIPIENT is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the bidding 
bank was a recipient of government TARP funding and the TARP assistance overlaps the period between 
the announcement and completion of the merger. ΔLNSALARY is the natural log of salary for the fiscal 
year of merger completion minus the natural log of salary for the fiscal year before merger 
announcement. ΔLNBONUS is the natural log of the sum of bonus post-merger and salary pre-merger 
minus the natural log of the sum of bonus pre-merger and salary pre-merger. ΔLNLT is the natural log of 
the sum of long term compensation post-merger and salary pre-merger minus the natural log of the sum 
of long term compensation pre-merger and salary pre-merger. LNAMV is the natural log of bidder market 
capitalization 4 weeks before merger announcement. Relative Size is the ratio of deal value as reported 
by Thomson One Banker divided by the acquirer market value. All the following financial variables are 
measured for the fiscal year before merger announcement and for the fiscal year of merger completion. 
M/B is the market value of assets. ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income divided by book 
value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. RETURN is the annual stock return for the fiscal year. 
LEVERAGE measures financial leverage, calculated as book value of total assets divided by book value 
of equity. RISK is the daily stock return volatility over one fiscal year. CAR3 is the bidder’s cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) measured over the 3-day announcement window (-1, +1), using the market 
model and the value-weighted CRSP index as the benchmark. PAY_CASH is the ratio of payment made 
in cash. TIME measures the number of days between announcement date and completion date divided 
by 365. PUBLICTARGET is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target bank is publicly traded. GDIV 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the headquarters of the bidder and target are not in the same State. 
CGI is our corporate governance index. We control for industry fixed effects, regional fixed effects, CEO 
fixed effects, financial crisis fixed effects and year fixed effects. We use White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors & covariance. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 ΔLNSALARY ΔLNBONUS ΔLNLT 
C 0.314  0.717  -1.004  
LNAMV -0.014  0.017  0.053  
RELATIVESIZE 0.086  -0.143  0.466  
M/B-1 -0.381  -0.322  0.318  
ΔM/B 0.791  -1.750** 1.390  
ROA-1 2.710  -17.951  31.383  
ΔROA 0.094  18.473  24.548  
RETURN-1 0.028  0.153  0.445  
ΔRETURN -0.085  0.214  0.197  
LEVERAGE-1 0.005  0.001  0.037  
ΔLEVERAGE -0.003  0.026  -0.001  
RISK-1 2.606  5.082  11.893  
ΔRISK -3.398*** -1.183* -0.546  
CAR3 0.574  0.140  -0.675  
PAY_CASH -0.043  -0.064  -0.077  
TIME -0.082  -0.193  0.124  
PUBLICTARGET 0.026  0.024  -0.132  
GDIV 0.041  -0.073  -0.035  
CGI -0.007  -0.055** 0.012  
TARP_RECIPIENT -0.415** -0.307* -0.120  
TARP_RECIPIENT* ΔRISK -10.988** 1.056  16.032  
    
Adjusted R-squared 0.268  0.065 -0.006 
No. of Observations 162 162 162 
Year dummies Included Included Included 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes 
CEO FE Yes Yes Yes 
Financial Crisis FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Figure 1 
Time distribution of Corporate Governance Index (CGI)
 Mean
 Median
